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Par ma foi! Il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la 
prose sans que j'en susse rien, et je vous suis le plus 
obligé du monde de m'avoir appris cela. 
(M. Jourdain in Moliere’s Le Bourgois Gentilhomme) 
Let me begin my remarks by saying that I endorse all that Poortinga (2015) has concluded 
in his assessment of cross-cultural psychology as approached over the last half century. 
Indeed, culture is a wobbly, polysemous concept that has assumed iconic status as an all-
purpose, albeit typically empty, explanatory variable in our globalizing world. Culture has 
become the “go-to” construct in ubiquitous media representations to help the person on the 
street make sense of observed differences in interpersonal behavior and social action 
between members of identifiable groups. Poortinga’s conclusions are much like mine, 
though we have discovered them in different ways: his by taking the conceptual, literature-
informed approach, and mine by engaging in cross-cultural research on specific, social 
psychological topics across the last four decades. 
I applaud culture’s emerging star status in public discourse, especially since the 
omnipresent fascination with culture helps pay my salary. Particularly in business faculties 
where I now teach, curriculum committees are eager to include courses involving culture, in 
part so that they can redeem the requirement of accreditation agencies to honor diversity 
and human rights agendas. Such courses also help attract fee-paying students from non-
Western countries who wonder how their local practices may fit into a globalizing world. 
These courses also help address crucial societal concerns like immigration, multiple 
identities, inter-personal communication, ethical practices, and justice that concern all 21st 
century members of our planet. I celebrate this confluence of interests, and am delighted to 
be teaching cross-cultural management, a subject that I present to my students as “applied 
social psychology.” 
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Practice as the Test of Truth 
When I am asked by psychologists what is my current academic interest, I typically respond, 
“To explain why a given person responds in a given way in a given social situation.” So, 
where does “culture” fit into this formula, as I go about my business of practicing its 
application to my outcomes of interest? My position, evolved over decades of publishing 
articles on culture and trying to make sense of the findings from what I regard as a sub-
discipline of social psychology, is that culture is context.  
To be more precise, culture enters the interpersonal response equation as the 
perceived ethnicities, gender, age, and birth places of the interactants, along with the nature 
of the social situation in which the interactants are currrently embedded (Bond, 2013). These 
factors function by socializing each interactant to a value, belief, and habit profile that guides 
his or her response to the other person, or persons, in the interpersonal or inter-group 
exchange; the perceived ethnicities, gender, age, and birth places of these others involved 
signal to the actor the likely motive, belief, and normative profile of this other or of these 
others present, as they are the audience for the actor’s responses just as the actor is for 
theirs.  
To be sure, this constitutes a complicated formula. However, depending on the 
situational press for certain responses, the perceived ethnicities gender, age, and birth 
places of the actor’s opposite number[s] may make little impact on his or her responses. 
Instead, situational norms prevail. These norms may arise because of what Stendhal 
termed, “le devoir de la situation,” and are operative trans-situationally, as a consequence 
of the human condition.  
Culture, then, is the norms of the situation for a given response interacting with the 
personality of the actor in varying proportion depending on the “press,” or strength, of that 
situation. As a social psychologist by domain of interest, I define a situation primarily with 
reference to the individuals participating in the event. We know from the seminal work of 
Gelfand et al. (2011) that national culture affects how strongly norms determine the 
response possibilities available to the actor with respect to these others.  
With this “definition” of culture, or perhaps what would better be termed “orientation 
towards studying culture,” readers will appreciate that I have done exactly what Poortinga 
(2015) suggested in his essay by crafting my own working approach to this unwieldy 
concept, defined in so many ways by so many researchers: “If ‘culture,’ or some other grand 
concept, can no longer serve as independent, mediating, or dependent variable, researchers 
will have to define more precisely the target and scope of their research” (p. 12). 
Unde venis et quo vadis? 
Where has my thinking come from and where will my current orientation lead my practice? 
Again, as Poortinga points out, I, like many others, began my work and publications in cross-
cultural psychology looking for differences (e.g., my first publication on cross- cultural 
psychology, Bond & Tornatzky, 1973). The whole field was looking for differences in basic 
psychological measures as a way to find a “place in the sun” dominated by mainstream 
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psychologists; differences, we hoped, would draw attention to what we were doing in 
researching “beyond the pale” with exotic personnel and respondents. My early reputation 
was made my editing anthologies of these “catalogues of difference” (e.g., Bond, 1986; 
1988). Into “the heart of darkness” we ventured. 
These discovered differences were subjected to two challenges: methodological and 
conceptual. Methodologically, many reviewers of our work questioned whether we were 
using equivalent measurement situations and measures, along with the appropriate 
statistical techniques to enable valid comparisons and conclusions to be drawn. These sorts 
of challenges continue to be addressed as best we can (see e.g., van de Vijver & Leung, 
2011). Conceptually, we were challenged to make sense of these differences (e.g., Messick, 
1988); how could these discovered differences be theorized about? Essentially we were 
asked, “So what?” What did these differences, even if correctly detected according to 
methodological and statistical dictates, tell us about humans and the many cultures of which 
they (and we) were a part?  
Unpackaging Culture Psychologically 
In response, we slowly began to realize that we needed to unpackage these differences in 
psychological responses across cultural groups, where “cultural groups” were typically 
student samples from specific locations in an ad hoc collection of nations. If successful, we 
could then argue that these differences occurred because persons in different nations were 
genetically endowed and then socialized to have higher or lower levels of the psychological 
construct, like independent self-construals, that was argued to be responsible for the 
observed difference (see e.g., Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai,1999, the earliest unpackaging 
study in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology). Psychological constructs became the 
mediating variables, and a cottage industry of psychological unpackagings sprung up, 
providing some empirical substance to the vague, fill-in-the-blank construct of “culture.”  
But, those of us in the research trenches of cross-cultural psychology began to realize 
that such attempts at unpackaging were not enough; we could not provide more than 
conjecture about why and how the (usually) national cultures were different in ways that led 
to the differences in levels of the psychological variables in our studies. We speculated about 
why, of course, using the available literature. We often found only partial, not full, mediation 
of culture’s effects, however, culture was operationalized, usually by nationality of our 
respondents. Much was missing by way of explanation, even if we used the current 
psychological constructs of choice, such as self-esteem, values, and expectancies or beliefs 
(e.g., Bond, Leung, & Schwartz, 1992).  
Puzzlingly, we occasionally found that the psychological construct of choice interacted 
with national culture to predict the outcome of interest (e.g., Bond & Forgas, 1984); 
apparently, national culture, unpacked in the hypothesized way, made the mediating 
variable more impactful for one nation’s members than for another’s. Was this uncooperative 
finding the important feature of culture for cross-cultural psychologists? Was culture a 
sensitizing agent for psychological responding? If so, how can we explain this variability in 
culture’s impact?  
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Enter the Dragon 
In order to solve this problem in a scientifically satisfying way, the field needed three 
inputs:  
1. Multi-cultural data sets: Early research involved only two-culture contrasts. With many 
units of culture, defined as nations, ethnic groups, organizations, schools, families, or 
dyads, researchers could position cultures with respect to one another on some 
measured variable. With this larger number of cultural units, the positioning could be 
tested for its aptness with tests of statistical power and compared to other plausible 
contenders as explanatory variables for the observed cultural differences.  
Of course, this cultural variable had to be plausibly relevant to the individual outcome of 
interest, like well-being or mate preferences. Cross-level statistical programs like HLM 
could then be used to assess the impact of the cultural variable of choice on the 
individual-level outcome of interest and the process that produced it. Empirically 
defensible conclusions could then be drawn. 
2. Culture-level variables that make sense to psychologists: At the level of nations, our field 
was replete with such suggestive measures, be they psychological, like social axioms 
(Bond et al., 2004), or eco-social, like affluence (Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004). 
Dimensionalizing of organizational culture (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990), 
team culture (Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, & Shea, 1993), and dyadic culture (e.g., McAuley, 
Bond, & Kashima, 2002) followed suit, providing cultural constructs to use for appropriate 
types of cultures, organizations, teams, and dyadic pairings, respectively. 
3. A wider consideration of what constituted a culture: Culture is a suggestive concept, 
easily applicable to a variety of social concepts – ascribed group memberships, like 
gender, ethnic group, and age category; or achieved memberships, like work 
organization, profession, religious group, and even urbanite, educated, and poor, as 
Poortinga states. These persons could be identified and measured on psychological 
constructs of self-views or other responses. Differences in outcomes could then be 
described and presented as “cultural” differences, and would be persuasive, especially 
if complex patterns of inter-related variables could be organized to portray a system 
within which members of the category were enmeshed. 
 
In this regard, it must be acknowledged that cross-“cultural” researchers are having their 
cake and eating it, too. Again, as Poortinga (2015) has warned, “If ‘culture,’ or some other 
grand concept, can no longer serve as an independent, mediating, or dependent variable, 
researchers will have to define more precisely the target and scope of their research” (p. 
12).  
This is exactly what is happening in practice – many of us researchers continue to 
invoke the powerful, storied concept of culture, but apply ourselves to examine whatever 
operationalization of culture addresses our current topic of interest and its associated 
outcomes. We define culture just as we wish for present purposes; it seems that Humpty 
Dumpty is a cross-cultural researcher, too! 
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The Grand Design 
What is lost in our adventure to date is the writing about culture as a grand design. At least 
in cross-cultural psychology, there is an absence of writing about the big picture, in the Great 
Tradition of a Clifford Geertz or a Gordon Redding. That absence is largely because we deal 
with psychological minutiae, not the system in which they are enmeshed, conjoined, and 
interacting. We are not trained or rewarded for such skill and vision, and it rarely appears in 
our literature. It seems to me that Harry Triandis (1995) was the last to try. 
The romantics of 19th century sociology and early 20th century anthropology are 
understandably frustrated. They, including me, lamenting,  
Upon this gifted age, in its dark hour, 
Rains from the sky a meteoric shower 
Of facts . . . they lie unquestioned, uncombined. 
Wisdom enough to leech us of our ill 
Is daily spun; but there exists no loom 
To weave it into fabric.”  
(Edna St. Vincent Millay, from “Upon This Age That Never 
Speaks Its Mind,” Collected Sonnets. New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1988, p. 140). 
 
Perhaps, however, we now possess a vision and the tools to realize a different Grand 
Design, viz., the embeddedness of a given individual in a variety of “cultures,” ranging from 
the nation as the most distal, to the organization or school in which he or she is working, 
and his or her family, as the more proximal, all interlarded with the demographics of ethnicity, 
age, and gender of his or her socialization background, and all features of the individual’s 
social identity to which others respond.  
This is a daunting agenda, layering and locating the individual within a nesting of 
cultural identities. Statistical techniques are now available to identify which of these cultural 
identities carried by each individual create differences in the model of individual responses 
that the researcher is testing. Not every feature of an individual’s culture need be considered, 
nor will they be impactful in any case. But, we can begin the scientific process of detecting 
how aspects of an individual’s cultural identity make a difference for specific types of 
responses. At least this approach will help me address the question I have set for myself 
and stated early in this essay, viz., “To explain why a given person responds in a given way 
in a given social situation.”  
I thank Poortinga for stimulating my thoughts on the question of where is culture in 
cross-cultural psychology.  
 “Curiouser and curiouser,” cried Alice. 
(Louis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland) 
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Can Humpty-Dumpty be a Good Cross-Cultural Psychologist? 
A Reply to Bond’s Comment 
Ype H. Poortinga 
Tilburg University, Tilburg Netherlands 
In numerous publications, Bond has addressed the conceptualization of culture and the 
methodology of culture-comparative research. His comment (Bond, 2016) on my essay 
about the status of the concept of culture in our field (Poortinga, 2015) testifies his expertise 
and insight. There are two points in the comment to which I would like to draw attention: the 
suggestions Bond has for culture-comparative research, and his vision on culture. I also 
relate these points to my original argument. 
Culture-Comparative Research 
Bond describes how cross-cultural psychology could make progress through (i) multi-cultural 
data sets, (ii) the distinction of individual and culture-level variables, and (iii) the analysis of 
relationships between variables. These are important principles for an agenda of empirical 
research. Cross-cultural psychology as an institutionalized field with conferences, a 
membership organization, and periodicals emerged in the mid-20th century when 
psychologists took an interest in differences. It can be said that during much of the first half 
century, the field was geared to comparing groups of people living in distinct contexts, and 
much effort was spent on organizing such differences in convenient formats. Accessible and 
literate samples have provided the bulk of the data: countries, students, and dimensions of 
values have become landmarks of much of our field.   
Bond has been both a critic and a contributor to this tradition. He has challenged the 
broad value dimension of individualism–collectivism, suggesting that further specification is 
needed (e.g., Bond, 2002). He has been one of the architects of one alternative, social 
axioms (e.g., Leung et al., 2002), that tends to show more factorial variation across 
countries, perhaps not surprisingly, as axioms are closer to conventions or everyday 
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practices. He has followed the recent trend of correlating societal indicators with frequency 
differences in distributions of genetic polymorphisms (Minkov & Bond, 2015). 
Methodological difficulties with this approach can probably best be dealt with through large-
scale projects, supplemented by various smaller and even local studies. In my dreams I 
imagine projects much larger than what we have seen so far, with two characteristics: a joint 
effort from the start including stakeholders from all participating populations, and a 
component of ontogenetic development (to study how variations in targeted patterns of 
behavior come about). Large education evaluation studies, such as the PISA (Programme 
for International Student Assessment) projects of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) are showing the direction to go. The goal of such projects is to 
unpackage the magnum mysterium, (see Bond & van de Vijver, 2011), “providing some 
empirical substance to the vague, fill-in-the-blank construct of ‘culture’” (Bond, 2016, see 
above). However, my guess is that the notion of unpackaging leaves scope for 
disagreement. Poortinga, van de Vijver, Joe, & van de Koppel (1987) wrote: “… the 
metaphor of a packaged variable implies that there is an essence to be discovered, which 
until the package has been unwrapped remains beyond the observer’s knowledge” (p. 22). 
The metaphor for culture my coauthors and I preferred was that of the onion; when peeling 
an onion you take off layer after layer until in the end the onion has disappeared completely. 
In other words, no variance is left to be explained at the end of a successful analysis. 
Perspective on Culture 
Rather than trying to fully explain differences between groups and making “culture” 
disappear, both as a source of variance and as a theoretical concept, Bond suggests that 
we take a fresh look at the big picture, i.e., the embeddedness of the individual in a variety 
of settings or contexts, called cultures. Such a viewpoint is moving away from a culture as 
a fixed categorical variable and taking a more situational and dynamic approach. Recently, 
there have been various formulations going in a similar direction. Following Aydinli and 
Bender (2015), a distinction can be made between approaches that allow for situational 
effects superimposed on an underlying orientation (e.g., situated cognitions from either a 
underlying individualist or collectivist position, as proposed by Oyserman, 2011) and 
approaches that allow switching between different cultural frames that are available to the 
(multicultural) individual (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). However, as far 
as I can see, in both kinds of approaches the term culture continues to imply some 
essentialism (the notion that cultural groups have specific shared characteristics) and/or 
reification (the process of making culture real and concrete). For example, Morris, Chiu, and 
Liu (2015) in a recent chapter introducing “polycultural psychology,” write in their abstract 
that “[i]ndividuals take influences from multiple cultures and thereby become conduits 
through which cultures can affect each other” (p. 631). It seems to me that Bond’s 
perspective on the cultural identities of the individual in the end appears to maintain that 
there is more to the package than just wrappings.  
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A Warm Welcome for Humpty Dumpty? 
To me there is a paradox between most of what Bond writes in his comment and his 
suggestion that, following Humpty Dumpty, we can define culture just as we wish to suit our 
purposes. In Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty reserves the right to choose meaning 
when he says about a word: "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." 
Are we to understand that Bond suggests that we can attribute meaning to “culture” as we 
see fit? How can there be a common goal and a common effort by a research community if 
every member can choose a personally preferred meaning? Of course, there can be 
different analytic perspectives if we define the subject matter of our research as behavior in 
context. Bond defines his orientation; to me this comes across as a serious attempt to 
provide direction to the field, and not as the kind of whimsical choice that Humpty Dumpty 
stands for.  
As I argued in my original essay (Poortinga, 2015), scientific communication 
demands precise meanings. Bond agrees that culture is too broad a concept for analysis. In 
concrete culture-comparative research projects, as Bond has conducted, variables are 
included in the research design that seek to maximize explained variance in the behavior 
that is the target of examination. There are many explanatory variables, but they all come 
(or at least are supposed to come) with a clear conceptual definition and an 
operationalization. There appears to be little difference of opinion on this. My question 
remains: do we need the concept of “culture” with its Humpty Dumpty associations in this 
pursuit?  
In summary, I can endorse most of Bond’s argument, but for me it does not follow 
that what he is after needs to be called “culture.” If we do without this term, we would avoid 
the surplus meanings that tend to come with it and that are likely to be an impediment on 
the road to understanding and explanation. 
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